Sunday 04 / October / 2026
New Delhi: The 2026 BRICS Summit in New Delhi may be remembered for debates over de-dollarisation, geopolitical rivalry and the growing influence of the Global South. But its declaration also advanced a quieter idea about how a multipolar digital economy could work: sovereign digital systems can remain nationally controlled while becoming increasingly interoperable.
The New Delhi Declaration placed sovereign digital ecosystems, interoperable Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) and artificial intelligence within the BRICS development agenda. It also welcomed work on a BRICS DPI repository and pilot projects, while recognising the Digital BRICS Forum and the Focus Group on Digital Public Infrastructure.
BRICS may not need a single digital stack. It may instead need sovereign stacks that can communicate with one another.
This creates what could be called an export paradox. India’s digital philosophy may have its greatest impact when partner countries adopt its principles while continuing to build and control technologies of their own.
The issue matters because technological diffusion increasingly has geopolitical consequences. AI models, cloud platforms, telecommunications equipment, payment systems and data architectures generate economic value as they spread, but they also establish standards, switching costs and institutional dependencies that can gradually narrow a country’s room for manoeuvre.
For emerging economies, the challenge is therefore to absorb foreign technology while retaining enough freedom to combine suppliers, change direction and negotiate from a position of choice.
From India Stack to a BRICS proposition
India’s Digital Public Infrastructure is associated with systems such as Aadhaar, the Unified Payments Interface, DigiLocker and consent-based data-sharing platforms. Their wider strategic importance lies in the architecture behind them: critical digital rails can remain nationally governed while governments and private companies build services on top.
India has increasingly incorporated this principle into its diplomacy. The government says it has signed DPI cooperation agreements with 24 countries covering digital identity, payments, data exchange and public-service delivery. The emphasis is on sharing architecture and design principles rather than simply exporting finished products.
India first gave DPI broad multilateral visibility during its 2023 G20 presidency, when Digital Public Infrastructure became a priority and was recognised as a development accelerator.
BRICS presents a different opportunity. Its members differ considerably in political systems, currencies, technological capabilities and relationships with major powers. This makes deep technological harmonisation difficult. A common digital regulator, shared identity system or single technology stack would require levels of political trust that BRICS does not possess.
Interoperability sets a lower threshold. National systems can remain distinct while common standards and interfaces allow them to communicate.
Payments provide the clearest example, but the principle extends further. National payment rails can connect without being replaced, while digital credentials could potentially become verifiable across jurisdictions and trusted data could move through agreed governance arrangements without creating a supranational database.
The proposition is therefore coordination while preserving national control.
From strategic autonomy to global South agency
This architecture fits India’s geopolitical position. China remains a neighbour, major economic partner, strategic competitor and fellow BRICS member. India has simultaneously expanded technology and security cooperation with the United States while retaining its preference for strategic autonomy.
An interoperable digital architecture complements that approach. India can retain control over critical national systems, operate across competing technology ecosystems and maintain alternatives as geopolitical conditions change. Its digital policy consequently gives an infrastructural expression to strategic autonomy.
The same principle may be even more valuable for emerging economies with fewer technological resources. Most Global South countries will continue to rely on foreign cloud providers, semiconductors, AI models, telecommunications equipment and industrial technologies.
A country may use American cloud services, Chinese hardware, Japanese or Korean industrial systems, Indian-inspired DPI, European regulatory standards and locally developed applications at the same time.
This creates a multiplex digital ecosystem. The challenge is managing it effectively.
Technology suppliers bring more than products. They also bring standards, financing arrangements, supply chains, data architectures and strategic relationships. Multiple suppliers can still create fragmented dependence if governments lack the capacity to manage them.
This makes orchestration capacity critical: deciding which suppliers operate at which layers, what data remains nationally controlled, where redundancy is required and when dependence on one ecosystem becomes a strategic vulnerability.
Interoperability creates options. Orchestration determines whether those options become genuine strategic agency.
Protocol power
Indonesia offers a practical illustration. Its QRIS payment system remains nationally governed while Bank Indonesia has expanded its cross-border connectivity. India could become another connection through QRIS-UPI interoperability.
If completed, QRIS would remain Indonesian and UPI would remain Indian. The value would lie in the interface between them. India’s digital philosophy would gain influence without requiring Indonesia to abandon its own payment infrastructure.
Bangladesh demonstrates the more difficult side. Its Binimoy interoperable payment platform encountered institutional and implementation problems before being discontinued. Bangladesh Bank subsequently moved toward an Inclusive Instant Payment System based on Mojaloop, an open-source architecture.
The lesson is that interoperability is not simply a technical exercise. It requires effective coordination among central banks, financial institutions, payment providers and technology partners.
It also reveals where geopolitical influence can migrate. Countries do not need to own another nation’s infrastructure to influence it. Standards, technical assistance, institutional design, open-source communities and capacity-building can shape the choices available to governments.
This is Protocol Power: influence exercised through the interfaces and rules connecting sovereign systems.
For India, this creates a different route to strategic weight. Its influence may grow not by persuading countries to replicate India Stack wholesale, but by helping sovereign systems connect.
The 2026 BRICS declaration brings the argument into the AI era. As emerging economies combine foreign chips, models, cloud services and applications, preserving alternatives around those technologies will become increasingly important.
India’s proposition is therefore less about eliminating technological dependence than managing it. Sovereign digital rails, open interfaces, diversified suppliers and stronger institutional capacity can give emerging economies greater room to manoeuvre.
A multipolar digital economy may ultimately be shaped not by countries that eliminate dependence, but by those capable of keeping dependence diversified, interoperable and negotiable.
