Dhaka: As events unfold in Bangladesh, there remains little doubt about the growing influence of various radical Islamist groups, including Jamaat-e-Islami in the country’s evolving decision making process.
Involved in war crimes during the country's liberation war, Jamaat-e-Islami is an Islamist party in Bangladesh that has been a controversial and divisive force in the country's politics. Under the Interim government of Muhammad Yunus, groups like Hefazat-e-Islam have gained prominence, advocating for stricter Islamic laws and opposing secular policies. This has led to increased tensions and violence, particularly targeting government institutions and minority communities
With Sheikh Hasina forced out and members of the Awami League being selectively targeted, the influence of religious fundamentalists will grow. Riding in on a wave of dissatisfaction with the Awami League, Mohammad Yunus’s interim government is already using religion as a counterweight to the League’s secular, socialist policies.
The fact that one of the first tasks of the Yunus government has been removing the ban on Jamaat-e-Islami and meet with Mamunul Haque, leader of the extremist group Hefazat-e-Islam, has meant that more radical groups feel they now enjoy protection from the authorities and can act with impunity.
Following the fall of the Sheikh Hasina government on August 5, there has been a significant rise in hate speech and attacks on religious minorities, particularly targeting the Sufi community.
Reports indicate around 50 attacks on Sufi shrines, with hardliners and radicals primarily responsible for these incidents. Devotees and volunteers have started gathering to protect these shrines from further attacks. It's a troubling situation, and many are calling for stronger measures to ensure the safety and protection of these cultural and religious sites.
Bangladeshi Hindus and moderate Muslims collectively hold these groups like Jamaat and Hefazat responsible for many of the recent attacks against religious minorities, secular intellectuals and journalists.
The traction of violent extremist ideology in the Muslim majority state of Bangladesh has always posed a serious security challenge. During its tenure Awami League being the only secular party in Bangladesh faced real challenges to balance between maintaining the pluralistic identity of Bangladesh and maintaining ties with the Islamic Clergy who hold a major influence among the people.
But since its fall in August 2024, religious minorities have endured atrocities in Bangladesh due to misleading information spread through online posts. The general pattern is as follows: “fake news” that incites violence against minorities quickly spreads online, beginning with local community accusations that members of minority groups have vilified Islam.
The use of the sentiments of the masses by a handful of politicians and religious leaders to gain ground and influence is concerning. Another propellant that fuels the communal disharmony is the activity of local clerics native to the region, who have used to have authority over the interpretation of the holy Islamic texts and use it to influence the masses to achieve their personal agendas. This is another force behind radical Islam’s grip on the country.
It is also important to emphasise that the rise of religious extremism and intolerance in Bangladesh is not just a side effect of politics. The issue reflects the struggle of an identity crisis where the Bengali-Muslim identity is being overwhelmed by an Islamic identity.
As Indonesia, another country that was considered a moderate Muslim state, has shown in the past, political crises can give rise to militants for whom religious fanaticism equals national pride. As a result, radical fringe groups such as Jamaat-e-Islami, Hefazat-e-Islam and Ansarul al Islam espouse a more intolerant brand of Islam, that equates being Bangladeshi with being an Islamist.
Rising radicalism in Bangladesh has a spillover effect on the neighbourhood, especially on Southeast Asian nations that already have Muslim populations. Links between Bangladeshi and Southeast Asian extremists appear to be growing, fuelled by increasing population movements across the region.
Bangladeshi migrants working in Singapore and Malaysia were known to recruit fellow workers for violence at home – a tiny proportion of the country’s overseas workers. Many had been supporters of Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT), a group responsible since 2013 for several fatal attacks on secular activists. ABT, which called itself Ansarul Islam, is the Bangladesh arm of al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS). Known for her steely nerves Sheikh Hasina Wajed's government did not flinch from taking strong action against groups like ABT. Now that the AL government has been forced out, it is highly possible that these AQIS linked ABT members will resume their activities in southeast asian communities.
There have been reports and concerns about connections between Bangladeshi Islamist groups and radical groups in Indonesia. These links often involve shared ideologies and sometimes operational cooperation. For instance, groups like Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in Indonesia have been known to have transnational connections, including with groups in Bangladesh. Additionally, the influence of global jihadist movements, such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS, has facilitated some level of coordination and ideological alignment between radical groups in these regions. During the height of ISIS Bangladeshis were known to use Kuala Lumpur as the take-off point for travel to Syria.
There are established networks that connect radical groups across borders. These networks often involve the exchange of resources, training, and operational support.
Indonesian and Malaysian mujahidin have long been interested in helping their persecuted brethren in Myanmar but have had no good channel for doing so.
The historical ties of Southeast Asian extremists were all to the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO) but those ties lapsed in 2001 after regional governments cracked down on Jemaah Islamiyah, RSO’s chief ally in the region. Later ARSA, an armed group on the border mounting attacks on Myanmar security forces, has inspired radical groups in Bangladesh, Indonesia and Malaysia to do more systematic recruiting among their respective Rohingya communities to find individuals willing to carry out attacks on their own. Indonesians, Malaysians and others seeking to assist the Rohingya in Myanmar have done so through contacts with Bangladesh-based Rohingya groups.
Radical forces in Bangladesh have always taken cues from the global Jihadi movement and attempted to resurrect local militancy in Bangladesh. These groups, conceivably financed by outsiders, use effective recruitment and training techniques. They utilise a warped, violent form of Islam that stray far from normative Islam.
The extremist Islamic narrative not only justifies acts of violence but also glorifies and deifies it. They have taken cues from Western media and marketing salesmanship, employing the use of explosive visuals and modern channels such as social media to grab the attention of the target audience in effective ways.
Similarly the July 2016 Dhaka bakery attack was viewed with envy by Indonesian ISIS supporters. Bahrun Naim, one of the leading pro-ISIS propagandists and promoter of attacks in Indonesia, wrote a widely
circulated tract, “Learn from the Caliphate Army in Bangladesh”, lamenting Indonesia’s inability to pull off anything as spectacular. He also noted how frequently Bangladeshi militants were able to mount attacks compared to their Indonesian counterparts.
The geographic scope of instability has expanded. In the early 2000s, Indonesia and the southern Philippines were the primary sources of instability in Southeast Asia. Now that source of radicalisation is increasingly becoming Bangladesh. Looking to the future, radical Islamist groups may try to exploit the plight of the Rohingya people in western Myanmar. Bangladesh–Myanmar border areas are a vulnerable place and almost all terrorist groups in Bangladesh use the Rohingya crisis in their recruitment rhetoric. The potential for cross-border radicalization between Bangladesh and southeast Asia, particularly Indonesia is a concern.
The threat is also increasingly emerging from seemingly non-militant civil society groups with radical agendas, rather than fully-fledged terrorist organisations. The rise of groups such as Hefazat-e-Islam in Bangladesh and the Islamic Defenders Front in Indonesia are evidence of this development. Groups like the Hefazat and Islamic Defenders Front groups have moved beyond being a mere nuisance through their obstructionist and disruptive tactics, to increasingly moulding the national agenda in Bangladesh and Indonesia respectively. These radical groups in Bangladesh and Indonesia seek to gain strength and support by tapping into mainstream social issues while espousing an anti-globalisation agenda.
The youth organisation of the Jamaat-e-Islami, the Islami Chhatra Shibir (ICS), is a member of the International Islamic Federation of Student Organizations as well as the World Assembly of Muslim Youth and has close contacts with other radical Muslim groups in Pakistan, the Middle East, Malaysia and Indonesia.
Western diplomats tend to downplay the extremist threat, viewing local militant Islamic movements as rather insignificant fringe groups. It is uncertain whether the US’s support for the Islamist leaning government in Dhaka is motivated by a desire to be overly diplomatic, or if they were based on poor intelligence. But such denials will only exacerbate what undoubtedly is a growing problem.
There is a risk that political transitions, with weak institutions, poor law enforcement and inadequate checks and balances, when protracted, provide a fertile breeding ground for violent extremism, which banks on the State’s incapacity to control the trafficking of people, weapons and drugs, which in turn can provide income to extremist networks.
Southeast Asians travel to Bangladesh for trade and study but also to take part in activities of Tabligh-i-Jamaat, an international Muslim missionary movement. The second largest global gathering of Muslims after the pilgrimage to Mecca is the tablighi meeting, Biswa Ijtema, that takes place every year outside Dhaka.
The Biswa Ijtema has been known to be used as a cover by extremists. Interaction also takes place through Hizb ut-Tahrir, the international organisation committed to a global caliphate. While avowedly non-violent, it has endorsed the use of violence by others against “enemies of Islam”, and Indonesia, which has one of the largest branches in the world, has seen a handful of Hizb ut-Tahrir members leave the organisation to cross over into violent extremism.
The former Hasina government banned Hizb ut-Tahrir in 2009, but the organisation was tolerated in Indonesia. Given the more tolerant approach of the Yunus government towards Islamists, it is likely that links between the two national branches of Hizb ut-Tahrir in the form of occasional visits and solidarity will see a rise.
With Political Islam settling in Bangladesh, its diffusion as an ideology is imminent. The weak state capacity of the Interim government in Bangladesh will lead to a further deteriorating security situation that radical Islamist groups are already attempting to exploit and sustain by offering services.
Most importantly the previous Hasina government had the political will to tackle radicalisation, but the present Yunus government is not even willing to acknowledge that there are several local and internationally linked Islamist terrorist groups operating in Bangladesh. Amid the apparent inability or unwillingness of the interim government in Bangladesh to crack down on radical islamists, homegrown radical groups will continue to gain momentum, leading to the sub-regional spread of radical Islamist tendencies, fostering further cross border radicalisation and extremism.
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